Review
Reviewed Work(s): Tolerance: Between Forbearance and Acceptance by Hans Oberdiek
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and “Knowing What it is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument,” by Michael Tye (which is a chapter from his *Consciousness, Color and Content*). Horgan’s paper outlines and defends a theory of mental properties that Horgan wishes to count as nonreductive, and responds to objections Lewis raises in various places to causally efficacious higher-order unreduced mental properties. (Horgan does concede that his view may still be “reductionist” in a sense like the one Lewis employs, so their disagreement may be about the causal efficacy of higher-order properties and the reference of mental terms, rather than about reductionism about the mental per se). Tye discusses Frank Jackson’s famous “Mary argument,” and the question of whether there is some nonphysical fact learned when Mary, who already knows all the physical and functional facts about color and color vision, sees color for the first time. Tye criticizes the Lewis/Nemirow “ability hypothesis,” that Mary’s new knowledge is entirely “knowledge how,” though he parries a range of objections that others have made to the ability hypothesis. Tye himself wants to argue that in coming to represent a fact she already had represented to herself, but in a new way, Mary should count as gaining new “knowledge that”—but this concession need not, of course, amount to admitting that there is some nonphysical fact that Mary comes to be aware of for the first time.

In providing nearly a dozen interesting papers on different topics addressed by Lewis’s metaphysical writings, Preyer and Siebelt have produced a volume that is interesting, important, and a pleasure to read. It is to be recommended not only to those with a specific interest in David Lewis’s work, but to anyone interested in contemporary metaphysics.

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Multiculturalism is not a flag that political philosophers seem eager to wave these days. Conservatives complain about the supposedly hazardous effects of the notion that non-Western societies have ideas and ways of life that are worthy enough to compete with those of Western societies for study and respect. Progressives worry that multiculturalism can be too uncritical of certain non-Western attitudes, especially about the nature and role of women. Perhaps this helps to explain why Hans Oberdiek is reluctant to associate his views too closely with multiculturalism, despite endorsing an ideal of tolerance that is quite sympathetic to it.
Oberdiek describes a spectrum of positions on the nature and value of toleration. At one end of the spectrum, toleration represents a modus vivendi—a practical stance parties take toward one another when neither is able politically or socially to dominate the other. At the opposite end of the spectrum lies a multicultural affirmation of tolerance as an important step toward a society that actually moves beyond toleration in understanding and appreciating difference among its members. Tolerance for the multiculturalist is a virtue whose object is the flourishing of difference and of valuable pursuits associated with different cultures, ethnicities, and religions. By contrast, toleration as a modus vivendi is merely a practice accepted by the tolerators from a self-interested point of view. In between these two approaches are positions that acknowledge the presence and contribution of the other.

The aim of Oberdiek’s book is to explore “the moral space between mere forbearance and full acceptance” (103). He rejects the self-interested perspective adopted by parties to a modus vivendi. A just society is one in which persons value the well-being of their fellow citizens. The powerless in particular need the protections offered by toleration in order to live a good life. Moreover, a good life will not truly be available to them unless tolerance is seen as a virtue and not simply a practice. Thus, Oberdiek speaks favorably of understanding difference and moving toward full acceptance. He thinks that persons with the virtue of tolerance will engage with one another in order to appreciate what gives meaning to the different kinds of lives they lead. The question I would raise is whether this could be a requirement of justice.

Oberdiek grounds his argument for tolerance as a virtue in what he calls “substantive liberalism.” Substantive liberals affirm a conception of the good. Autonomy, for Oberdiek, is the central value. Tolerance is needed so that persons can freely judge how best to lead their lives (120). The result, he believes, is that we will lead better lives.

There is ambiguity in Oberdiek’s treatment of the value of autonomy. He approvingly quotes J. S. Mill’s discussion of self-cultivation. In a society of Millian individuals, the virtue of tolerance would be of mutual benefit. It would permit and encourage individuals to develop according to their own unique tendencies. It would also provide persons with the stimulation of exposure to new ideas. At the same time, Oberdiek stresses the value of community as context for individual choice. He supports group rights that would help to sustain minority communities threatened by the dominant culture. This proviso generates some tension, for group rights may constrain experiments in living associated with the free development of individuality.

In response, Oberdiek appears to retreat to a more neutral position. Autonomy is realized whenever persons lead lives they find meaningful—even when they do not choose their lives through Millian experimentation and the lives they prefer are not liberal in substance. So autonomy becomes self-direction, where “we are self-directed when we respond appropriately to reasons pro-
vided by our goals, relations, and situation” (119). This means that the substance of autonomy will vary contextually. Oberdiek’s conception of autonomy is considerably thinner than Mill’s.

This gives rise to a serious challenge to Oberdiek’s defense of tolerance as a virtue. The mere practice of toleration might suffice to accommodate a thin conception of autonomy. Yes, persons need a right not to be interfered with. But why is understanding and appreciating difference required by justice? Why must we “enter into conversation” with those whose values we reject (128)?

One answer Oberdiek gives is this: tolerance as a virtue is needed to prevent oppression. Without the other-regarding virtue of tolerance, “we are more likely to surrender to our initial negative reaction to what we dislike or disapprove. … As a consequence, we are likely to inflict serious wrongs on innocent others” (135). In other words, we need to cultivate tolerance as a virtue in order to curb our desire to oppress those who values differ from ours.

I am doubtful of this quite ominous view of human nature, though it is understandable that members of powerful groups might be sensitive about this tendency. In any case, it is not clear why we would need substantive liberalism in order to curb tendencies toward domination. Oberdiek suggests that without substantive liberalism we are faced with nothing better than a modus vivendi between parties vying for power, an unstable protection against domination. This overlooks other alternatives. I will focus on that offered by political liberalism.1

Political liberals charge that substantive liberalism is socially divisive. Oberdiek himself claims, “Autonomy is one, and only one, moral idea. There are other worthy ways to live”(122). Presumably, then, reasonable persons could reject the value of autonomy that relies on tolerance as a virtue, in favor of orienting their lives around other values, for example, those declared by a traditional religion. Political liberals claim that a conception of justice must be justified on grounds that all reasonable citizens could accept. Oberdiek’s substantive liberalism risks alienating persons who not unreasonably may reject the substantive value of autonomy it affirms.

Nevertheless, political liberalism regards toleration as something more than a modus vivendi. A society is tolerant and just when it is organized by political values—such as equal rights and basic liberties—that can be shared by citizens who disagree about fuller conceptions of the good. Such a society affirms a more narrowly political conception of justice. Persons with a sense of justice will recognize the right of their fellow citizens to lead lives they find meaningful, when doing so is compatible with political values that could underwrite shared institutions. They do not strive to dominate each other, yet neither are they required to understand, engage with, and appreciate their differences. Some citizens will prefer to leave well enough alone.

Oberdiek elaborates his defense of the virtue of tolerance by stressing the value of “recognition.” Persons cannot lead meaningful lives without cultural
support. The viability of minority cultures is threatened by the dominant culture. Thus, the well-being of members of minority groups depends on understanding and support from the wider society. Nonrecognition is a form of oppression.

But this argument does not suffice to support substantive liberalism. Policies in support of minority cultures—for example, permitting limited self-govern-ment for aboriginal groups or private, religious schooling—could be defended as a response to unjust treatment or, more generally, on grounds of due respect for freedom of conscience or association. This plausibly would not require others to cultivate understanding and appreciation of cultural difference. Some persons may accept the policies as a matter of justice for minorities whose values they reject or find uninteresting. Political liberalism allows this. Thus, we need not endorse substantive liberalism in order to support the opportunity for all persons to lead lives they find meaningful.

I suspect that a more robust commitment to multiculturalism underlies Oberdiek’s emphasis on autonomy. He claims that substantive liberals see the value in protecting whatever gives life meaning—provided that, on balance and under the circumstances, it is worthy (137). The ideal society is one that has moved beyond toleration, and fully accepts a plurality of comprehensive values. This is indeed a vision of the good. What Oberdiek has not shown is why persons who adhere to particular conceptions of moral truth and would not open those conceptions to critical scrutiny lack a sense of justice. He confuses justice and the good. Nevertheless, we learn much from this book’s thorough survey, detailed history and thoughtful discussion of an important and timely topic.

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Notes

I am grateful to Lionel McPherson for his very helpful suggestions.